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Laws protecting wildlife challenge the notion of unrestricted 
dominion over private property, in some cases substantially restricting 
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the extent to which a landowner can modify her property and thus 
alter the natural landscape. The prescriptive nature of these laws, and 
the broad, often indeterminate, dynamic landscape to which they 
apply, heighten the opportunity for conflict with landowners’ 
expectations about the absolute and permanent nature of their 
rights.1 
 
As demonstrated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,2 
government attempts to protect the environment are often 
thwarted by Fifth Amendment takings claims demanding that “just 
compensation” be paid to the property owner.  In Lucas, an 
environmental regulation that protected upland coastal resources, 
such as habitat for endangered and threatened species, prohibited 
a landowner from developing his beachfront property.3  The 
landowner challenged the statute, claiming that it was a Fifth 
Amendment taking of his property without just compensation.4  
The United States Supreme Court held that because the regulation 
wiped out all economic value of the property, it was a taking.5  The 
Court, however, also established an exception to the rule, holding 
that the state could overcome the claim if it could prove on remand 
to the South Carolina Supreme Court that “background principles” 
of the state’s law of property already placed restrictions on the 
landowner’s title.6  Such “background principles,” the Court 
continued, must “do no more than duplicate the result that could 
have been achieved in the courts by adjacent landowners (or other 
uniquely affected persons) under the state’s law of private 
nuisance, or by the state under its complementary power to abate 
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”7 
The Court advanced the Lucas decision as a clarification of 
federal takings law.  However, the Court’s reference to 
“background principles” of state property law as the only potential 
exception to “preservation takings” raises important issues as to the 
meaning and scope of this exception.  The Court’s equation of 
1. Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild 
Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L. 
REV. 849, 858–59 (2000). 
2. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
3. Id. at 1006–07. 
4. Id. at 1003. 
5. Id. at 1019. 
6. Id. at 1029. 
7. Id. 
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“background principles” with common-law nuisance includes a pair 
of deeply rooted property law principles that limit property owners’ 
rights under certain circumstances: the public trust doctrine and 
the wildlife trust doctrine.  Legal scholarship since Lucas has 
highlighted this aspect of the case, focusing primarily on the 
Supreme Court’s introduction of the “background principles” 
inquiry.  One scholar noted: 
 
The Court’s reliance on common law principles to craft an exception 
to its per se compensation rule misapprehended the continued 
robustness of old maxims, such as those restricting the uses to which 
private property can be put when they threaten wildlife, and thus 
potentially created an exception much wider than intended.8 
 
Another scholar, noting how Lucas has opened the door for 
application of the public and wildlife trust doctrines, explained that 
with traditional takings analysis 
 
courts investigate first, whether there has been a permanent physical 
taking . . . and second, whether there has been a regulatory taking 
that has resulted in no economically viable remaining use of the 
property. . . . [T]raditional takings analysis . . . has come under 
considerable attack.  Most seriously, the analysis ignores the 
exception laid out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council for 
background principles of property law, such as the public trust 
doctrine, that have the potential to provide a much firmer defense of 
wildlife.9 
 
No scholar has discussed, however, the oral arguments presented 
during the Lucas remand before the South Carolina Supreme 
Court.  These arguments offer definitive proof of the accuracy of 
prior observations regarding the public and wildlife trust doctrines 
and also provide a glimpse into how these doctrines may shape 
modern takings law as state and federal courts apply evolving 
8. Babcock, supra note 1, at 855.  The use of such “robust maxims” may be particularly 
important as almost ninety percent of the nearly 1000 plant and animal species protected 
under the ESA are found on private land.  Id. at 857–58.  As such, private property creates a 
large web of wildlife habitat, without which these species would likely become extinct. 
Despite these facts, federal and state environmental laws are increasingly coming under 
attack by private property owners who often see these limitations on property rights as, at the 
most, unconstitutional, and at the least, always compensable. 
9. Anna R.C. Caspersen, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of 
“Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357, 384 (1996). 
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public and wildlife trust principles.  Original research reveals that 
during the oral arguments, the court actually invited the state to 
assert the public trust doctrine as a background principle of 
common law pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s 
directive.10  Inexplicably, the state of South Carolina failed to make 
a public trust argument during the remand.  Nonetheless, this 
invitation by the court lends new support to the argument that 
these doctrines may be asserted to protect environmental 
regulations from takings claims under the circumstances presented 
in Lucas. 
Environmental regulations clearly merit protection given modern 
legislative attempts to enact compensation requirements for 
regulation affecting property rights, such as proposed federal 
legislation which would have required compensation for “any 
diminution” in the value of private property.11  Several states have 
recently passed similarly sweeping laws.12  This type of legislation 
directly targets public preservation efforts, including the South 
Carolina statute at issue in Lucas13 and the federal Endangered 
Species Act,14 among others.  In view of such “takings legislation,” it 
is important to analyze historical judicial precedent regarding 
10. See infra notes 149–159 and accompanying text.  No author has before, to my 
knowledge, discussed the actual oral arguments presented on remand to the South Carolina 
Supreme Court.  These arguments were neither transcribed in court documents, nor 
detailed in the final court order.  When I contacted the court to request a copy of the 
recording, the court staff informed me that I was the first person to make such a request. 
11. See Just Compensation Act, H.R. 1388, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993).  Two other 
“takings” bills were introduced during the same Congressional term, as the Private Property 
Owners Bill of Rights was introduced in both houses of Congress in 1993.  BONNIE B. 
BURGESS, FATE OF THE WILD:  THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE FUTURE OF 
BIODIVERSITY 79–80 (2001). 
12. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(b) (West 2007) (requiring compensation if new 
government regulation negatively impacts “an existing fair market value” of property).  See 
also Ballot Measure 37, OR. REV. STAT. § 197.305(1)–(3)(d) (2005) (renumbered from OR. 
REV. STAT. § 197.352 in 2007 by the Oregon Legislative Counsel).  Measure 37 either 
“requires state and local governments to compensate private property owners for the 
reduction in the fair market value of their real property that results from any land use 
regulations of those governmental entities that restrict the use of the subject properties,” or 
“allows state and local governments to ‘modify, remove or not apply the land use regulation’” 
at all.  MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 312 (Or. 2006) (emphasis 
added).  The Oregon Supreme Court upheld Measure 37, which was passed by referendum 
by the people of Oregon.  See id.  Louisiana and Mississippi have also enacted similar 
legislation.  See George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving “Partial 
Takings” from Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAW. 269, 278–79, 281 (2005). 
13. See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying text. 
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000). 
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environmental regulation of private land. 
There now exists a new lens through which to analyze historical 
and modern jurisprudence which sheds additional light on the 
takings analysis—the lens of the Lucas remand.  Historical land use 
restrictions, such as the public and wildlife trust doctrines, provide 
a means to protect environmental interests with a tool more 
powerful than traditional takings analysis.  As indicated by the 
court in the Lucas remand, the public and wildlife trust doctrines 
may be used to obviate certain court-ordered or statutory 
compensation requirements in order to allow the regulation of 
natural resources that the government deems to be of the utmost 
public interest.  Furthermore, use of these doctrines may be 
necessary if the federal and state governments are to adequately 
protect important natural resources via environmental regulation.  
As one scholar noted, “government could not function if it had to 
pay all those inconvenienced by regulatory actions for the benefit 
of the public at large.”15 
This article seeks to address more thoroughly how the historical 
“old maxims” of the public and wildlife trust doctrines can be used 
as Lucas background principles of property law to overcome takings 
challenges brought against state and federal environmental 
regulations.  First, I will describe the historical underpinnings of 
the public trust doctrine and the wildlife trust doctrine prior to the 
founding of the nation.  I will then summarize Illinois Central 
Railroad v. Illinois16 and Geer v. Connecticut,17 which are the key 
Supreme Court cases establishing the validity of these doctrines in 
the United States.  I will also discuss how the public trust doctrine, 
as presented in Illinois Central, and the wildlife trust doctrine, as 
presented in Geer, are driven by the same logic and the same 
historical background.  I assert that the doctrines may be 
interchangeably applied as a means of protecting important 
environmental resources.  Also, I will show how these doctrines 
have expanded beyond the subject matter presented in the seminal 
cases and have evolved into tools useful for shielding regulations 
addressing a wide range of environmental resources from takings 
claims. 
15. Caspersen, supra note 9, at 389 (summarizing the position of former Secretary of the 
Interior Bruce Babbitt). 
16. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
17. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
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Second, I will illustrate how the use of these doctrines might have 
changed the ultimate outcome of the Lucas case.  During the Lucas 
remand, the state of South Carolina missed an important 
opportunity to ensure that the public and wildlife trust doctrines 
were firmly established as precedents for overcoming takings claims 
brought against regulations protecting important coastal resources.  
Furthermore, the state deprived the court of an opportunity to 
demonstrate that specific application of public and wildlife trust 
background principles may evolve over time as part of a state’s 
body of common law.  The court’s willingness to allow such 
evolution is evidenced by the fact that it invited the state to assert 
the public trust doctrine, even though South Carolina courts had 
never before considered public trust protection for the specific 
resources at issue in Lucas.18  In addition, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, I will argue that federal courts can, under their own 
analysis, uphold application of the public and wildlife trust 
doctrines under the circumstances presented in Lucas.19  Illinois 
Central and Geer indicate that these doctrines, much like the police 
power, are background principles of property law that inhere in 
every state at the time of each state’s creation.  In other words, the 
public and wildlife trust doctrines inhere in the property rights 
systems of each state equally and independently, regardless of 
whether the courts of individual states have previously incorporated 
these doctrines into their jurisprudence regarding specific natural 
resources.  Thus, even if public and wildlife trust protection of 
certain resources is not present within a state’s preexisting body of 
common law, state and federal courts may permit controlled 
evolution of public and wildlife trust principles within states 
applying the doctrines in order to shield preservation regulations 
from federal takings claims.   
18. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
19. This point counters potential arguments that the Supreme Court could not have 
done so because federal courts will not create state common law, nor will they apply the 
common law of one state to another if the latter state’s courts had not previously 
incorporated the common law principle in question into its jurisprudence.  See Murdoch v. 
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). 
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II. THE PUBLIC AND WILDLIFE TRUST DOCTRINES:  HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 
A. Pre-American Roots 
A review of the historical underpinnings of the public and 
wildlife trust doctrines demonstrates that private property rights, as 
understood at the founding of America, have long yielded to 
important public environmental interests.  These doctrines are 
deeply rooted in American notions of property ownership and land 
use, stemming from ancient Rome and subsequently passing from 
England to the American Colonies and ultimately to the various 
states. 
In ancient times, Roman law divided property into either public 
or common property.20  Public property included  
 
res nullius, res communes, res publicae, res universatitis, and res divini juris; 
respectively, things that are unowned and open to all by their nature, 
things that are publicly owned and made open to the public by law, 
things owned by a public group in its corporate capacity, and things 
‘unownable’ because of their divine or sacred status.21 
 
The Roman government viewed wildlife as a res nullius public 
property interest—the property of no one.22  Wildlife being animals 
ferae naturae (“of a wild nature”) were reducible to ownership by 
any person who could capture them.23  The rule of capture was 
distinguished from the rules governing common property, or res 
communis, such as the oceans and navigable bodies of water.24  The 
Romans’ believed that such property “remained held in 
common . . . so that no individual could appropriate any portion of 
it by any unilateral act whatsoever.”25  Roman protection of common 
property, therefore, may be characterized as the first 
implementation of public trust principles by a governmental 
authority. 
20. Geer, 161 U.S. at 522. 
21. James Boyle, Foreword:  The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 
(2003). 




0.6. HUDSON.34.1 NO BANNER 3/9/2009  1:58:31 PM 
106  COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 34:1 
 
However, the Romans viewed wildlife as a public property interest, 
rather than common, because: 
 
There are things which we acquire the dominion of, as by the law of 
nature, which the light of natural reason causes every man to see, and 
others we acquire by the civil law; that is to say, by methods which 
belong to the government . . . .  [T]he law of nature is more ancient, 
because it took birth with the human race . . . .  Thus, all the animals 
which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air, that is to 
say, wild animals, belong to those who take them, because that which 
belongs to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the person who 
first possesses it.26 
 
Based on this view, the United States Supreme Court has 
reasoned that Roman conceptions of natural law placed little 
restriction on the power of an individual to take and control 
wildlife.27  The right of individuals to control wildlife in Roman 
times was distinct from the government’s authority to protect 
“common property” resources under its lawmaking power. 
A shift occurred, however, in feudal Europe, when countries first 
began to assert that the right to control wildlife should be “subject 
to the governmental authority under its power, not only as a matter 
of regulation, but also of absolute control.”28  This shift was 
recognized by the eighteenth century French treatise writer 
Pothier, who noted that “[i]n France, as well as in all other civilized 
countries of Europe, the civil law has restrained the liberty which 
the pure law of nature gave to every one to capture animals who . . . 
belong to no person in particular.”29  Pothier further noted that 
“the sovereigns have reserved to themselves, and to those to whom 
26. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
27. Id.  The Court in the Geer opinion provided a thorough historical discussion of the 
relationship between governments and citizens in the area of wildlife regulation.  However, it 
appears that the Court presented an inaccurate history regarding the characterization of 
wildlife as common or public during Roman times.  The Court asserted that wildlife was 
common property, rather than public, because wildlife, “having no owner, were considered 
as belonging in common to all the citizens of the state.”  Id. at 522.  This is contradictory to 
the modern interpretation, as presented by Epstein, supra note 22, which characterizes 
wildlife in Roman times as public property, rather than common.  Thus, the history 
recounted in this article tracks the modern interpretation of ancient history, and attempts to 
consolidate the modern view with the overarching premise regarding wildlife put forth by 
the Court in Geer. 
28. Geer, 161 U.S. at 523. 
29. Id. at 524 (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.). 
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they judge proper to transmit it, the right to hunt all game, and 
have forbidden hunting to other persons.”30 
Pothier explained that “ancient” authors, such as those during 
Roman times, opposed this viewpoint, and had claimed that “as 
God has given to man dominion over the beasts, the prince had no 
authority to deprive all his subjects of a right which God had given 
them.”31  These ancient authors argued that natural law permitted 
hunting to each individual, and that any civil law which forbade it 
was “contrary to the natural law, and exceed[ed], consequently, the 
power of the legislator, who, being himself submitted to the natural 
law, can ordain nothing contrary to that law.”32  Pothier responded 
to these arguments, stating that:  
 
It is easy to reply to these objections . . .  From the fact that God has 
given to human kind dominion over wild beasts it does not follow 
that each individual of the human race should be permitted to 
exercise this dominion.  The civil law, it is said, cannot be contrary to 
the natural law.  This is true as regards those things which the natural 
law commands or which it forbids; but the civil law can restrict that which 
the natural law only permits.  The greater part of all civil laws are 
nothing but restrictions on those things which the natural law would 
otherwise permit.33 
 
Thus, natural law was no longer seen as absolute in the wildlife 
context, but instead permissive:  the sovereign could restrict that 
which natural law merely allowed.  Under this reasoning, 
governments could legitimately implement regulations for the 
protection of wildlife, because an overall community benefit, 
bestowed by a system of civil law, trumped the permissive natural 
law interests of individual private parties. 
Even Blackstone, who wrote that property was the absolute right of 
every Englishman,34 distinguished between property which was 
private and property which was of common interest to all.  
Blackstone pointed out that the right of an individual to possess 
property depended on the nature of the property and whether or 
not it was held in “common.”  Blackstone stated that “after all, 
30. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.). 
31. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.). 
32. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.). 
33. Id. (quoting Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Droit de Proprieté, Nos. 27–28.) 
(emphasis added). 
34. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *134. 
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there are some few things which, notwithstanding the general 
introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably 
remain in common . . . .”35  With specific reference to wildlife, 
Blackstone noted that  
 
it cannot be denied, that, by the law of nature, every man, from the 
prince to the peasant, has an equal right of pursuing, and taking to 
his own use, all such creatures as are ferae naturae, and therefore the 
property of nobody, but liable to be seized by the first occupant.  And 
so it was held by the imperial law, even so late as Justinian’s time. . . .  
But it follows from the very end and constitution of society, that this natural 
right, as well as many others belonging to man as an individual, may be 
restrained by positive laws enacted for reasons of state or for the supposed 
benefit of the community.36 
 
In modern times, Blackstone’s assertion that the taking of wildlife 
may be restricted by positive law became a commonly held view 
regarding wildlife regulation, as well as other types of 
environmental regulation, in England.  Furthermore, these basic 
principles passed from England to the American colonies.37  In 
1694, the Massachusetts Bay Colony enforced the first closed 
hunting season in North America, which applied to all deer within 
the colony.38  In 1708, various New York counties also established 
closed seasons to protect the populations of various game species.39  
Regulation of wildlife thus “vested in the colonial governments, 
where [it was] not denied by their charters, or in conflict with 
grants of the royal prerogative.”40  Today, states maintain the same 
“prerogative,” since “the power which the colonies thus possessed 
passed to the states . . . and remains in them at the present day, in 
so far as its exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, 
the rights conveyed to the federal government by the 
constitution.”41  Every state in the Union has since ratified the 
35. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *14.  See also Geer, 161 U.S. at 526. 
36. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *410 (emphasis added).  See also Geer, 161 
U.S. at 527. 
37. In fact, early England passed laws which established preserves, similar to U.S. wildlife 
refuges, which were intended to protect the land from grazing by domesticated animals.  
Babcock, supra note 1, at 882. 
38. Shannon Petersen, Bison to Blue Whales:  Protecting Endangered Species Before the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 22-SPG ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 71, 73 (1999). 
39. Id. 
40. Geer, 161 U.S. at 527. 
41. Id. at 528. 
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common law principles espoused by Blackstone by legislating for 
the protection of important environmental resources.42 
Thus, early state efforts to incorporate wildlife and 
environmental regulations into their respective bodies of law 
exhibit that early state governments did not set out to aggressively 
guard private property rights at the expense of protecting 
important public resources.43  Furthermore, as Hope Babcock has 
noted, “The view of property that crossed the ocean and found root 
in the colonies, therefore, was not absolute, certain, or exclusive, 
but was encumbered by communal and political obligations well 
into the eighteenth century and beyond.”44  This governmental 
prerogative, which later took the form of the public and wildlife 
trust doctrines, trumped private property interests, to a degree, and 
became one of the first forms of environmental regulation widely 
accepted as constituting such “communal obligations.” 
B. The Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines in the United States—
Introduction to Illinois Central and Geer 
In order to understand the legal significance of the public and 
wildlife trust doctrines, it is first necessary to analyze the holdings 
in the seminal cases establishing those doctrines and the 
theoretical underpinnings of each doctrine within American 
jurisprudence.  These cases demonstrate that the United States 
Supreme Court long ago validated the use of the public and 
wildlife trust doctrines as a means of protecting important public 
resources and overcoming takings claims. 
1. Illinois Central 
In 1869, the Illinois legislature granted title of lands submerged 
under Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad (the 
Railroad).45  Approximately fourteen years later, the state sought to 
undo this grant by bringing a claim against the Railroad asserting 
that the Railroad had “encroached . . . upon the domain of the 
state, and its original ownership and control of the waters of the 
42. EPA, State Environmental Agencies, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/state.htm (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
43. Babcock, supra note 1, at 876. 
44. Id. 
45. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 437 (1892). 
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harbor and of the lands thereunder . . . .”46  The Railroad, which 
had already commenced reclamation of a portion of the land for 
the purpose of laying tracks and other development, sought to 
retain the property by claim of the previous state grant.  The Court, 
however, found that the Railroad did not have a legitimate claim to 
the property because title to submerged lands  
 
is a title held in trust for the people of the state . . . .  The trust 
devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be 
discharged by the management and control of property in which the 
public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the 
property.  The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can 
never be lost . . . .47 
 
The Court’s analysis relied largely on its characterization of lands 
under navigable waters as “property in which the whole people are 
interested” and as public property “of a special character.”48  The 
Court also noted at length the value of the Chicago harbor to the 
people of the state of Illinois.49  In doing so the Court asserted that 
the Railroad’s claim of ownership to the submerged lands, if 
allowed to succeed, would “place every harbor in the country at the 
mercy of a majority of the legislature of the state in which the 
harbor is situated.”50  The Court therefore rejected the Railroad’s 
claim, asserting that the lands were “a subject of public concern to 
the whole people of the state.  The trust with which they are held, 
therefore, is governmental, and cannot be alienated . . . .”51  The 
Court continued by explaining that “[t]his follows necessarily from 
the public character of the property, being held by the whole 
people for purposes in which the whole people are interested.”52  
Thus, the public trust doctrine, though implicitly referenced in 
earlier cases,53 was explicitly established by the United States 
46. Id. at 438. 
47. Id. at 452–53. 
48. Id. at 453–54. 
49. Id. at 454–55. 
50. Id. at 455. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 456. 
53. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842) (finding it unjustifiable “[i]f 
the shores, and rivers and bays and arms of the sea, and the land under them, instead of 
being held as a public trust for the benefit of the whole community . . . had been converted 
by the charter itself into private property, to be parcelled out and sold by the duke, for his 
own individual emolument[.]”).  One author has noted that the Court in Martin found that 
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Supreme Court.  The language used by the Court laid the 
foundation for numerous subsequent cases involving the public 
trust and arguably established the public trust doctrine as a 
longstanding background principle of property law.54 
The theory driving the public trust doctrine, as derived from 
Illinois Central, is that the public’s rights in trust lands inhered prior 
to private property owners’ rights.  Thus, under certain 
circumstances when the two conflict, as when the state conveys 
public trust lands to private hands or enacts legislation which may 
limit property rights, the private property rights must be 
subordinate to the rights of the public.55  In other words, the 
government may not inappropriately favor private parties with 
public trust resources, nor can private property owners assert 
control over resources in which the public has a paramount 
interest.56 
2. Geer 
Geer involved a Connecticut statute which regulated the hunting 
of game birds.  The appellant argued that the state lacked authority 
to enact the regulation.  Using similar language to that in Illinois 
Central, the Supreme Court held that states have the right to 
“control and regulate the common property in game,” and such 
control “lodged in the state . . . [and] is to be exercised, like all 
other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the 
people . . . not . . . for the benefit of private individuals as 
distinguished from the public good.”57  The Court found that the 
state had authority to regulate game because of wildlife’s “peculiar 
“the public trust character of navigable waters and their submerged lands survived a grant by 
the King of his proprietary interest in them . . . the question was whether it also survived the 
American Revolution.  [The Court] declared that it did.”  MICHAEL BEAN & MELANIE 
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 11 (3d ed. 1997). 
54. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
(1928); State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000); Sierra Club v. 
Dep’t of Forestry and Fire Protection, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered 
not published); National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Lassen 
v. Ariz. ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dept., 385 U.S. 458 (1967); Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 
1996). 
55. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the 
Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 71 (2005). 
56. Babcock, supra note 1, at 892–93. 
57. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1896). 
0.6. HUDSON.34.1 NO BANNER 3/9/2009  1:58:31 PM 
112  COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 34:1 
 
nature . . . and its common ownership by the citizens of the State.”58  
Geer is the foundational case establishing wildlife as an 
environmental interest which may be legally protected pursuant to 
the public interest. 
In 1979, Hughes v. Oklahoma59 overruled Geer, but only on the 
narrow issue of whether a state could actually own wildlife.60  In 
Hughes, a defendant claimed that an Oklahoma law prohibiting the 
interstate sale of minnows procured within the state was 
unconstitutional because it violated the federal government’s 
Commerce Clause power.  The Hughes Court ruled in favor of the 
defendant, finding that the statute was indeed unconstitutional.61  
However, the Court left fully intact the power of the state to act 
pursuant to the wildlife trust doctrine, as long as the state did not 
hinder interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution.  The 
Court affirmatively pointed out that “overruling Geer does not leave 
the states powerless to protect and conserve wild animal life within 
their borders,”62 and “the general rule we adopt in this case makes 
ample allowance for preserving . . . the legitimate state concerns for 
conservation and protection of wild animals.”63 
Ultimately, the wildlife trust doctrine, as established in Geer, 
recognizes that “[w]ildlife management in this country has been a 
prerogative of government since colonial times, as it was in 
England, and, as in England, laws regarding wildlife have helped 
define property rights.”64  Because the wildlife trust doctrine 
inheres in the title to property prior to private interests obtaining 
that title, it prevents landowners from using property in a way that 
damages wildlife resources in which the public has an interest.  
State laws protecting such resources are simply codifications of this 
common law principle.65   
58. Id. at 530. 
59. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
60. See generally id.; see also Babcock, supra note 1, at 885. 
61. See generally Hughes, 441 U.S. 322. 
62. Id. at 338. 
63. Id. at 335–36.  At least one modern court interpreted Hughes to preclude the finding 
of a Fifth Amendment taking for wildlife regulations because “the state as trustee has the 
power to regulate to protect wildlife for the benefit of the public at large.” Caspersen, supra 
note 9, at 383 (citing to Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994)). 
64. Babcock, supra note 1, at 883. 
65. Id. at 889. 
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C. Historical and Legal Parallels of Illinois Central and Geer 
The public and wildlife trust doctrines have nearly identical 
historical roots, as detailed in Illinois Central and Geer.  An historical 
analysis of the two cases allows for a virtual merger of the two 
doctrines, as the foundation for each doctrine can be traced to the 
same source—the English crown. 
In Illinois Central, the Court, quoting People v. N.Y. & Staten Island 
Ferry Co.,66 stated that: 
 
 The title to lands under tide waters, within the realm of England, 
were by the common law deemed to be vested in the king as a public 
trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them . . . .  The 
king, by virtue of his proprietary interest, could grant the soil so that 
it should become private property, but his grant was subject to the 
paramount right of public use of navigable waters, which he could 
neither destroy nor abridge.  In every such grant there was an implied 
reservation of the public right, and so far as it assumed to interfere 
with it, or to confer a right to impede or obstruct navigation, or to 
make an exclusive appropriation of the use of navigable waters, the 
grant was void.67  
 
The Court continued by citing Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co.,68 
which described the transmission of the public trust doctrine from 
England to the several states.  The Court stated that “prior to the 
Revolution the shore and lands under water of the navigable 
streams and waters of the province of New Jersey belonged to the 
king of Great Britain, as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and 
devolved to the state by right of conquest.”69  The Court asserted 
that after conquest “the said lands were held by the state, as they 
were by the king, in trust for the public . . . .  [B]eing subject to this 
trust, they were publici juris; in other words, they were held for the 
use of the people at large.”70 
Similarly, the Court in Geer, which was decided four years after 
Illinois Central, traced an almost identical route to the source of the 
wildlife trust doctrine—from England to the colonies and finally to 
the states.  The Court noted that “[t]he practice of the government 
66. 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877). 
67. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1896). 
68. 32 F. 9 (C.C.N.J. 1891) 
69. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 457 (quoting Stockton, 32 F. at 19). 
70. Id. (quoting Stockton, 32 F. at 19–20). 
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of England from the earliest time to the present has put into 
execution the authority to control and regulate the taking of 
game.”71  The Court continued by stating: 
 
Undoubtedly, this attribute of government to control the taking of 
animals ferae naturae, which was thus recognized and enforced by 
the common law of England, was vested in the colonial 
governments . . . .  It is also certain that the power which the colonies 
thus possessed passed to the states with the separation from the 
mother country, and remains in them at the present day.72 
 
The Court further noted that at that point in time most states 
had already passed laws for both the protection and the 
preservation of wildlife.73 
71. Scholars have stated that “the essential core of English wildlife law on the eve of the 
American Revolution was the complete authority of the King and Parliament to determine 
what rights others might have with respect to the taking of wildlife.”  BEAN, supra note 53, at 
10.  The Supreme Court has asserted that this same power transitioned to the states in an 
unchanged form: “[W]hen the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of 
government, and took into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and 
regalities which before belonged either to the crown or the parliament, became immediately 
and rightfully vested in the state.”  Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 416 (1842). 
72. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1896).  Scholars have noted that 
 
the English conceptualization of wildlife as res communes (belonging to no individual, 
like the air and oceans) and ferae naturae (animals which by their nature are wild) and 
common law doctrines that applied to wildlife took root in this country and endured 
largely without change.  English laws, which gave the Crown complete authority to 
determine the rights of landowners with respect to wildlife management, also became 
part of the common law of the colonies and eventually that of the several states which 
assumed the Crown’s responsibility to act ‘as trustee to support the title [to wildlife] for 
the common use.’ 
 
Babcock, supra note 1, at 880–81.  An example of the lengths to which the crown in England 
could go in order to restrain private property rights is the use of “Forest Jurisdiction”—a 
system of forest laws which went so far as to have special courts and officials administer them.  
In these jurisdictions, “all forest land ‘was subject to an easement for the benefit of wildlife’ 
that allowed forest officials to enter private land and remove vegetation needed for wildlife.”  
BEAN, supra note 53, at 9.  The Forest Jurisdiction began in England when “William the 
Conqueror laid waste thirty-six Towns in Hampshire to make a Forest.”  Id.  This is an 
extreme example of land use regulation to say the least. 
73. Geer, 161 U.S. at 528.  Once again, “protection and preservation” of wildlife might 
necessarily entail protection and preservation of wildlife habitat.  The Court’s historical 
tracing of the wildlife trust doctrine further indicates that “game” is not an exhaustive list of 
resources protected by the trust.  The Court quoted Blackstone’s assertion that the “natural 
right” of man to control game, “as well as many other [natural rights] belonging to man as an 
individual, may be restrained by positive laws enacted for reasons of state or for the supposed 
benefit of the community.”  Id. at 527 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *411) 
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Illinois Central and Geer demonstrate that the public and wildlife 
trust doctrines not only have the same historical background, but 
are largely driven by the same reasoning.  Both doctrines 
emphasize holding in “trust” certain natural resources in which the 
public has an interest, and each doctrine highlights the need to do 
so for the benefit of the people.  Both doctrines also predate and 
limit private property rights to a degree.  Furthermore, at least one 
court has interpreted Geer as the application of the public trust 
doctrine, rather than as the application of a distinctly designated 
“wildlife trust doctrine.”  The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Pullen v. 
Ulmer,74 used the public trust doctrine to protect salmon as an asset 
of public interest because it found that “the state ‘acts as trustee of 
the natural resources for the benefit of its citizens.’”75  In doing so, 
the court noted that though Hughes overruled Geer on the 
ownership issue, “[n]othing in the opinion . . . indicated any 
retreat from the state’s public trust duty discussed in Geer.”76  In 
addition, at least one scholar has since noted that “[i]n Geer v. 
Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court applied the public 
trust doctrine to the taking of wildlife.”77 
The public and wildlife trust doctrines are, therefore, 
interchangeable.  Illinois Central and Geer, handed down four years 
apart, demonstrate that both lake beds under navigable waters and 
wildlife are on the same plane of resources in which the public has 
a keen interest.  Furthermore, cases since Illinois Central and Geer 
indicate that courts should not focus on whether the subject of 
regulation is a lake bed or a game animal, but instead on whether 
the regulation in question addresses an important public resource.  
Various courts, as discussed below, have asserted that wildlife, 
plants, and the habitats upon which these flora and fauna depend 
are of great public import.78  Therefore, if courts find these 
environmental amenities to be covered under the public or wildlife 
trust doctrines, regulations protecting those amenities may be 
immune to takings claims.  If there is no pre-existing right arising 
from a landowner’s title to property that allows the landowner to 
use, allocate or destroy trust resources, then no taking of private 
(emphasis added). 
74. 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996). 
75. Id. at 60 (quoting Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988)). 
76. Id. (emphasis added). 
77. Kanner, supra note 55, at 72 (emphasis added). 
78. See infra note 102. 
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property can occur.79 
D. Broad Application of the Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines to 
Environmental Resources 
Some might argue that Illinois Central’s application of the public 
trust doctrine should be limited to the specific subject matter that 
the case addressed, i.e., submerged lands.  In fact, the most recent 
Supreme Court decision upholding application of the public trust 
doctrine to tidelands demonstrates the Court’s narrow focus on this 
particular natural resource.  In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,80 
the Court considered whether the state of Mississippi could exert 
the public trust doctrine to protect forty-two acres of non-navigable 
tidelands.  The Court noted the existence of a long line of cases 
upholding “State[ ] dominion over lands beneath tidal waters.”81  
The Court concluded that “our cases firmly establish that the 
States, upon entering the Union, were given ownership over all 
lands beneath waters subject to the tide’s influence.”82 
However, because most United States Supreme Court decisions 
explicitly invoking the public trust doctrine have dealt with 
submerged lands, it does not follow that the Supreme Court 
intends to so limit the doctrine’s application.83  The Court’s non-
acceptance of public or wildlife trust cases regarding other natural 
resources is by no means definitive evidence that the Court would 
refuse to apply those doctrines to other resources.  On the 
contrary, lower courts’ application of these doctrines to numerous 
other resources and the lack of Supreme Court grants of certiorari 
to those types of cases demonstrate that it is not the Court’s intent 
to limit the scope of these doctrines to submerged lands.84  The 
application of the public trust doctrine (or wildlife trust doctrine) 
to wildlife in Geer lends the strongest evidence in this regard.  As 
discussed, the two doctrines have the same historical roots, and the 
79. Babcock, supra note 1, at 893–94. 
80. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
81. Id. at 474. 
82. Id. at 484. 
83. In fact, in Phillips the Court found that “[s]tates have the authority to define the limits 
of lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”  Id. 
at 475.  But see Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep’t, 385 U.S. 458 (1967) (the Court 
considered application of the public trust doctrine to public lands clearly owned by the state).  
See also Kanner, supra note 55, at 83. 
84. See infra note 102. 
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Supreme Court used nearly the same language when applying the 
doctrines in Illinois Central and Geer.  Thus the argument that the 
Supreme Court intended the public trust doctrine to apply only to 
submerged lands has little merit. 
A closer reading of Illinois Central suggests that submerged land is 
but one example of a number of resources in which the “public has 
an interest,” and which may be protected from takings claims 
brought by private property owners.  First, the Court asserted that 
the state must exercise the trust which “devolve[s] upon [it] for the 
public, and which can only be discharged by the management and 
control of property in which the public has an interest.”85  Similarly, the 
Court stated, “The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor, 
and of the lands under them, is a subject of public concern to the 
whole people of the state.  The trust with which they are held, 
therefore, is governmental, and cannot be alienated . . . .86  The 
Court found that “[t]his follows necessarily from the public 
character of the property, being held by the whole people for 
purposes in which the whole people are interested.”87 
Property in which the “public has an interest” and which is a 
“subject of public concern” is not limited to submerged lands 
under navigable waters.  The Court’s choice of language supports 
such a conclusion.  The Court twice uses the word “like” when 
referring to lake beds: 
 
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the 
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under 
them . . . than it can abdicate its police powers . . . .  So with trusts 
connected with public property, or property of a special character, 
like lands under navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely 
beyond the direction and control of the state.88 
 
The Court’s use of the word “like” indicates its intent to set 
submerged lands off as merely an example of a resource in which 
the public has an interest, and which the state can control by 
asserting the public trust doctrine, rather than as an exhaustive list. 
In fact, it appears from the second statement above that the 
operative language that triggers protection is “property of a special 
85. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (emphasis added). 
86. Id. at 455 (emphasis added). 
87. Id. at 456 (emphasis added). 
88. Id. at 453–54 (emphasis added). 
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character.”  This language indicates that courts should focus on a 
specific subset of resources for application of the public trust 
doctrine (in addition to “public property,” of course).  
Furthermore, the Court’s apparent test to determine whether to 
apply the public trust doctrine is whether a “property of a special 
character” is being held “for purposes in which the whole people 
are interested,” rather than the narrow factual determination that 
the resource itself is submerged land. 
The Illinois Central Court also provided an interesting analogy 
that further demonstrates the broad application of the public trust 
doctrine to a variety of public interests.  The Court discussed the 
case of Newton v. Mahong County Commissioners,89 which involved an 
1874 act passed by the Ohio legislature that ordered the transfer of 
a county seat from one town to another.90  Citizens brought suit, 
arguing that the original act of 1846 establishing the county seat in 
their town “constituted an executed contract which is binding on 
the state,” and the 1874 act unconstitutionally “impair[ed] the 
obligation of the contract.”91  The Court disagreed, declaring that 
state legislatures must be allowed the freedom to protect important 
public interests regardless of what commitments previous 
legislatures made.92  The Illinois Central Court reiterated this 
principle, and stated that: 
 
[L]egislative acts concerning public interests are necessarily public 
laws . . . ; it is vital to the public welfare that each [legislature] should 
be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and 
present exigencies attending the subject may require . . . . 
 . . . [I]f this is true doctrine as to the location of a county seat, it is 
apparent that it must apply with greater force to the control of the soils 
and beds of navigable waters in the great public harbors held by the 
people in trust for their common use and of common right, as an 
incident to their sovereignty.93 
 
The “true doctrine” to which the Court is referring is the 
doctrine of legislative discretion regarding the protection of 
important public interests.  The Court, however, made its doctrinal 
89. 100 U.S. 548 (1879). 
90. Id. at 556. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 559. 
93. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 459–60 (emphasis added). 
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analogy to a clearly “non-environmental” matter, and in doing so 
demonstrated the wide range of public trust interests to which the 
doctrine may apply.94 
The more recent expansion of the public and wildlife trust 
doctrines to numerous other environmental resources also exhibits 
that its common law application is not confined to the narrow 
scope that some may argue it should have.  The public trust 
doctrine’s scope has been expanded to protect important 
recreational, educational, scientific, and aesthetic resources in 
which the public has been deemed to have an interest.95  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court of Iowa recognized that the public trust 
doctrine has “emerged from the watery depths [of navigable 
waterways] to embrace the dry sand area of a beach, rural 
parklands, a historic battlefield, wildlife, archaeological remains, 
and even a downtown area.”96 
94. Id. at 460.  The Court also introduced a temporal element into the analysis when it 
stated, “[t]he legislation which may be needed one day for the harbor may be different from 
the legislation that may be required at another day.  Every legislature must, at the time of its 
existence, exercise the power of the state in the execution of the trust devolved upon it.”  Id.  
This premise demonstrates that circumstances can change, and this principle should also 
apply to which resources are considered subject to the trust in the first instance—the harbor in 
Illinois today, the beachfront in South Carolina tomorrow.  In fact, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, the Court stated that “changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was 
previously permissible no longer so.”  505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). 
95. Babcock, supra note 1, at 891.  See also Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) 
(noting the “growing recognition” that the public trust doctrine applies to tidelands because 
such lands “serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments 
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the 
scenery and climate of the area”). 
96. State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa 1989) (citing Richard Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:  Questioning The Public Trust Doctrine, 
71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 632–33 (1986)).  See also National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 
P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (public trust doctrine prevented Los Angeles from draining non-tidal 
streams which fed a lake upon which wildlife depended); Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 884 A.2d 867 (Pa. 2005) (applying the public trust doctrine to protect the 
battlefield at Gettysburg).  Furthermore, in Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996), the 
Alaska Supreme Court noted that Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), overruled the 
state ownership doctrine as it was presented in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), for 
the purpose of preventing interference with interstate commerce.  Nonetheless, the court 
noted that Hughes made clear that the state’s public trust responsibilities regarding wildlife 
remained intact.  The court went on to note that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution 
incorporated public trust responsibilities and “compel[led] the conclusion that fish 
occurring in their natural state are property of the state for purposes of carrying out its trust 
responsibilities.”  Pullen, 923 P.2d at 60.  The court then stated that “it is the authority to 
control naturally occurring fish which gives the state property-like interests in these 
resources.  For that reason, naturally occurring salmon are, like other state natural resources, 
state assets belonging to the state which controls them for the benefit of all of its people.”  Id. 
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This expansions of the doctrines have held up numerous times in 
the face of Fifth Amendment takings claims.  The wildlife trust 
doctrine was originally used to protect government regulations that 
restricted not only the killing of game, but also the harming of game 
from Fifth Amendment takings claims.97  As early as 1881, the 
Illinois Supreme Court used language which indicated that not 
only may states regulate the taking of wildlife, but may also regulate 
harm which may occur to wildlife as reasonably judged by the 
legislature: 
 
 So far as we are aware, it has never been judicially denied that the 
government, under its police powers, may make regulations for the 
preservation of game and fish, restricting their taking and 
molestation . . . although laws to this effect, it is believed, have been in 
force, in many of the older States since the organization of the 
Federal government. . . .  On the contrary, the constitutional right to 
enact such laws has been expressly affirmed . . . .  And upon 
principle, the right is clear. 
 The ownership being in the people of the State . . . and no 
individual having any property rights to be affected, it necessarily 
results, that the legislature, as the representative of the people of the 
State, may withhold or grant to individuals the right to hunt and kill 
game, or qualify and restrict it, as, in the opinions of its members, will 
at 61.  Another scholar stated regarding the expansion of the public trust doctrine:  
 
 In its early form, the public trust doctrine applied to submerged lands, the foreshore 
and navigable waters and protected the public’s rights and interests in navigation, 
fishing, and commerce.  Since the 1970s, states and courts have extended the scope of 
the doctrine to protect other public uses including hunting, boating, swimming, 
bathing, and other recreational activities.  Under the influence of changing public 
perceptions, states have applied the public trust doctrine to preserve and protect 
tidelands and other environments that provide food, shelter and habitat for birds and 
marine life and that enhance the scenery and climate of certain areas.  The 
geographical reach of the doctrine has also been expanded.  The public trust doctrine 
now also encompasses non-navigable waters and streams as well as parks, land, wetlands 
and wildlife.  Thus, compared to its original scope, the public trust doctrine has been 
expanded considerably. 
 
EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES 51 (Kluwer Law 
Int’l 2001) (citations omitted). 
97. See infra notes 116–117 and accompanying text; see also infra note 134.  The “harming” 
of game in a legal sense may result from the destruction of habitat, which creates a 
potentially far-reaching expansion of wildlife trust doctrine coverage beyond the actual 
animals themselves.  Such an expansion could potentially guard a much wider range of 
environmental regulations from takings claims. 
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best subserve the public welfare.98 
 
The focus on “harm” and “molestation” is important as these 
terms arguably include harm or molestation resulting from habitat 
destruction, thus bringing important ecological habitat under the 
protection of the wildlife trust doctrine.99 
One scholar has even stated that “[i]t is thus apparent that courts 
generally find no duty to compensate landowners for economic 
losses that result from state or federal restrictions on the killing of 
wildlife.”100  Another scholar has noted that, if the wildlife trust 
doctrine can be effectively asserted against takings claims, then 
“[t]hose who care about protecting wildlife may find . . . that 
wildlife laws may escape the Just Compensation Clause, thereby 
taking out of harm’s way important wildlife habitat.”101  As discussed 
below, some courts have been willing to extend the wildlife trust 
doctrine, as a protection from Fifth Amendment takings claims, 
beyond game animals.  Protection has indeed already been 
extended to animal habitat, as well as plants, in order to preserve 
the important public interests provided by those resources.102 
The following cases demonstrate that the principles established 
in Illinois Central and Geer extend beyond the protection of wildlife.  
In these cases, courts used these doctrines to protect plants and the 
overall habitats of both flora and fauna.  Such an extension has 
huge implications for expanding the scope of the public and 
wildlife trust doctrines to protect various environmental regulations 
from takings claims. 
Barrett v. State provides one example that demonstrates the broad 
authority of the government to regulate private land in the name of 
wildlife and environmental protection.103  In that case, plaintiffs 
brought a takings claim against a New York statute that declared, 
“[n]o person shall molest or disturb any wild beaver or the dams, 
houses, homes or abiding places of same.”104  The court undertook an 
98. Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320, 327 (1881) (emphasis added). 
99. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
100.  BEAN, supra note 53, at 37. 
101. Babcock, supra note 1, at 903. 
102. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
(1928); State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000); Sierra Club v. 
Dep’t of Forestry and Fire Protection, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered 
not published); National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
103. 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917). 
104. Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
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interesting and unusual analysis of the history of beavers in New 
York, detailing the importance of that animal to the state.  The 
court noted that beavers were at one time “very numerous” in the 
state of New York, but because of their great economic value, they 
were killed almost to the point of extinction.105 
Plaintiffs claimed that vast acres of valuable timber were felled by 
beavers, the population of which was recovering under the 
statute.106  The lower court found that the plaintiffs had incurred 
damage of $1900 due to the beavers and granted plaintiffs that 
amount in damages.107  On the state’s appeal, the plaintiffs 
maintained the following three claims:  first, the state could not 
protect an animal that was destructive; second, the 1904 law 
prohibiting the molestation of beavers prohibited plaintiffs from 
protecting their property, and thus was an unreasonable exercise of 
the police power; and third, the state was in possession of the 
beavers which had caused the damage and was thus liable for 
damage caused by them.108 
The court responded by stating that “the general right of the 
government to protect wild animals is too well established to be 
now called into question. . . .  Their preservation is a matter of 
public interest. They are species of natural wealth which without 
special protection would be destroyed.”109  The court noted that 
this power in New York dated back to 1705, when the colony passed 
a similar act for the protection of deer.110  Despite the fact that 
individual landowners may be harmed, the court stated that such 
regulation was “clearly a matter which is confided to [the 
legislature’s] discretion.”111  The court further found that “[t]he 
state may exercise the police power ‘wherever the public interests 
demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily 
vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of 
the public require, but what measures are necessary for the 
protection of such interests.’”112  The court, echoing Illinois Central’s 








112. Id. at 101 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894)) (emphasis added). 
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whole people are interested,”113 stated as follows: 
 
 The eagle is preserved, not for its use but for its beauty. 
 The same thing may be said of the beaver.  They are one of the 
most valuable of the fur-bearing animals of the state.  They may be 
used for food.  But apart from these considerations their habits and 
customs, their curious instincts and intelligence place them in a class 
by themselves.  Observation of the animals at work or play is a source 
of never-failing interest and instruction.  If they are to be preserved 
experience has taught us that protection is required.114 
 
Thus, the court concluded that protecting beavers was within the 
authority of the legislature, largely because protection was of great 
interest to the public at large.115  As noted, not only was protecting 
the beaver a valid act, but so too was prohibiting molestation of the 
beaver or its habitat since “[t]he destruction of dams and houses 
w[ould] result in driving away the beaver.”116  According to this 
reasoning, not only may a state regulate the taking and molestation 
of an animal itself, but also the habitat upon which the animal 
depends.  This is a clear expansion of wildlife protection towards 
general environmental protection and is reflective of many state 
and federal laws today. 
Barrett is cited as an early manifestation of the public trust 
doctrine’s application to wildlife for the purposes of defeating a 
takings claim.117  Perhaps more importantly, Barrett lays a historical 
foundation for the expansion of the public trust doctrine to cover 
general environmental concerns, rather than merely protecting the 
taking or hunting of game animals.  The holding in Barrett provides 
an example of how modern courts may hold modern 
environmental laws to be valid governmental measures to protect 
important public interests without payment of “just compensation.” 
The case of Miller v. Schoene,118 decided in 1928, further 
113. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453–54 (1892). 
114. Barrett, 116 N.E. at 101. 
115. Id. at 102. 
116. Id. at 101. 
117. Caspersen, supra note 9, at 382. 
118. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).  The Court, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, construed Miller as 
one of several cases establishing the denial of takings claims when the state uses its police 
power to regulate activities that are “akin to public nuisances.”  505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992); 
see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (state prohibited the manufacture of alcoholic 
beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (state barred the operation of a 
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demonstrates the broad authority of states to regulate private 
property to prevent environmental degradation without incurring 
compensation liability under a Takings Clause analysis.  In Miller, 
plaintiffs challenged the Cedar Rust Act of Virginia,119 which gave 
the government the authority to force private property owners to 
cut trees to prevent the spread of a plant disease.  The state 
entomologists had ordered plaintiffs to cut a large number of trees 
on their own property to protect an apple orchard on an adjoining 
property.120  Plaintiffs claimed this was a violation of their 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.121 
The Court first noted the importance of apple harvesting in the 
state of Virginia as the state’s economy was highly dependent upon 
orchards.  The Court found that given the purpose of the statute, 
to protect the apple economy, the state was necessarily forced to 
choose between “the preservation of one class of property and that 
of the other.”122  The Court reasoned that “[w]hen forced to such a 
choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by 
brick mill in a residential area); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (state 
effectively prevented continued operation of a quarry in a residential area).  In Lucas, the 
Court actually rejected this use of the state’s police power, despite having upheld such a use 
under the circumstances of Miller.  However, given the blurry line between the use of the 
police power to protect the public from harm and the use of the public trust doctrine to 
preserve interests important to the public, Miller could equally be construed as the latter.  It 
has been noted that 
 
 [i]t is sometimes difficult to fix boundary stones between the private right of property 
and the police power . . . .  But it is recognized that the State as quasi-sovereign and 
representative of the interests of the public has a standing in court to protect the 
atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or 
dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately concerned. 
 
Babcock, supra note 1, at 876.  See also infra notes 191–193 and accompanying text.  The 
Court in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1896), and the Minnesota and Illinois 
courts it cites, seems to assert that use of the police power to protect animals is synonymous 
with use of the wildlife trust doctrine. 
119. The statute stated that it was  
 
unlawful for any person to ‘own, plant or keep alive and standing’ on his premises any 
red cedar tree which is or may be the source or ‘host plant’ of the communicable plant 
disease known as cedar rust, and any such tree growing within a certain radius of any 
apple orchard is declared to be a public nuisance, subject to destruction. 
 
Miller, 276 U.S. at 277. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 279. 
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deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to 
save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater 
value to the public.”123  Apple harvesting was “one of the principal 
agricultural pursuits in Virginia” and the statewide value of red 
cedars was “shown to be small as compared with that of the apple 
orchards of the state.”124  The Court therefore dismissed the 
contention that this “case is merely one of a conflict of two private 
interests,” and instead found it “obvious that there may be, and that 
there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of the 
one interest over the other.”125  Thus, the Court ruled that the 
public interest in protecting apple orchards superseded the interest 
of the private landowner in keeping his trees, and that the state 
acted legitimately to protect the more important resource in such a 
circumstance.126 
Perhaps most interestingly, the Court in Miller decided that it 
need not “weigh with nicety the question of whether the infected 
cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law or 
whether they may be so declared by statute,” because where “the 
choice is unavoidable, we cannot say that exercise [of the police 
power], controlled by considerations of social policy which are not 
unreasonable, involves any denial of due process.”127  Thus, the 
Court reasoned that the takings issue could be decided not on the 
basis of nuisance, but on the basis of the general public policy 
interests at stake.  This assertion by the Court is particularly 
intriguing, especially considering how the legal analysis of takings 
law has become increasingly opaque in modern times.128  In Miller, 




126. Id. at 280. 
127. Id.  The Lucas dissent also noted a parallel to Miller when it stated that  
 
the Court has relied in the past, as the South Carolina court has done here, on 
legislative judgments of what constitutes a harm . . . .  In Miller, the Court adopted the 
exact approach of the South Carolina court:  It found the cedar trees harmful, and their 
destruction not a taking, whether or not they were a nuisance. 
 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1053 n.17 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  In 
other words, the dissent argued that legislatures can use the police power to determine what 
constitutes harm and can pass legislation pursuant to those findings that is impervious to 
takings claims.  See infra note 164. 
128. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
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could justify regulation of private property for environmental 
purposes, not only by prohibiting landowners from engaging in 
certain activities, but even to the point of requiring affirmative acts 
by a private landowner to destroy the landowner’s own property.129 
In addition to the early twentieth century cases, at least two post-
Lucas courts have allowed states to assert the public and wildlife 
129. Other cases also demonstrate how courts have invoked “reasonable social policy” to 
uphold legal protections for important resources pursuant to the public and wildlife trust 
doctrines.  In the 1919 case State v. Pollock, the Supreme Court of North Dakota ruled on the 
validity of a law that criminalized the possession of certain fish between the months of March 
and May.  175 N.W. 557, 558 (N.D. 1919).  Plaintiffs contended that the statute was an 
unconstitutional interference with the right of U.S. citizens to “acquire and protect property, 
in that any statute which interferes with this right, except in cases where the public health, 
morals, or safety or the general welfare authorizes such restrictions as an exercise of police 
power, is . . . unconstitutional and void.”  Id.  The court noted the historical roots of state 
control over wildlife when it stated that  
 
the ownership of game being in the first instance lodged in the people of the state, may 
be reserved by them . . . .  Any ownership which an individual is allowed to acquire may 
be subject to such conditions and limitations as the people acting through their 
legislative agents, may wish to impose. . . . This power of the state is based largely on the 
circumstance that the property right to the wild game within its borders is vested in the 
people of the state in their sovereign capacity; and as an exercise of its police powers 
and to protect its property for the benefit of its citizens, it is not only the right but it is 
the duty of the state to take such steps as shall preserve the game . . . .  [C]onsequently 
nothing is taken from the individual and his constitutional rights are not infringed . . . . 
 
Id. at 559 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Similar to the 
Court in Miller, the court in Pollock made an interesting policy valuation in this passage, 
stating that governments not only have the legal right to regulate the environment, but also 
have the affirmative duty to preserve the public’s proprietary environmental interests.  The 
court found that the government’s exercise of its duty does not infringe upon individual 
constitutional rights, which would presumably include the right to claim a taking without just 
compensation.  Another case which demonstrates the focus on social policy regarding 
environmental regulation is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).  In Toomer, the Court 
augmented the legal “ownership” analysis which courts had previously used to justify state 
regulation of wildlife, and blatantly asserted that policy considerations regarding the public 
interest were in and of themselves sufficient support for valid environmental regulation.  
Toomer involved an assertion by Georgia shrimpers that South Carolina statutes regulating 
commercial shrimp fishing off the coast of South Carolina were unconstitutional.  See id. at 
389–91.  South Carolina defended its regulations by invoking an historical line of laws 
regarding wildlife ownership—beginning in Roman times and as passed on to individual 
states by colonial governments.  Id. at 399–401.  The Court stated that “[t]he whole 
ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal 
shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate 
the exploitation of an important resource.” Id. at 402.  As in Miller, the Court indicated that 
the necessary ingredient for protecting environmental regulations from takings claims was 
that plaintiffs demonstrate a state interest in preserving the environment, as an “important 
resource,” for the people as a whole.  Id. 
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trust doctrines as common law background principles of property 
law, pursuant to Lucas, as a defense to takings claims brought 
against environmental regulations protecting a broad spectrum of 
natural resources.  The court in State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc.130 
rejected a takings claim by owners of property who had been 
ordered to remove fences which kept threatened snakes from 
reaching their habitat.  The court found that “[t]he State’s interest 
in protecting its wild animals is a venerable principle that can 
properly serve as a legitimate basis” for denying the claim.131  In 
Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection,132 a timber 
harvest permit was denied to a plaintiff because harvesting would 
have caused habitat destruction that would have threatened various 
endangered species.  The court found that “wildlife regulation of 
some sort has been historically a part of the preexisting law of 
property.”133 
The above cases demonstrate that courts have found a wide range 
of public environmental interests to be paramount to private 
property rights.  These precedents have great implications for 
modern takings jurisprudence in the area of environmental 
regulation.  The cases establish that the public and wildlife trust 
doctrines, as background principles of property law, may be used to 
shield environmental regulations protecting a variety of important 
public resources from the takings claims brought by private 
property owners.  If jurisprudence in this area were to continue to 
develop in this direction, the outcome of a case similar to Lucas 
might be quite different.  Because the statute at issue in Lucas was 
enacted in part to protect endangered species that depend on 
coastal habitat for survival, an extension of wildlife trust principles 
to that habitat might have saved the regulation from the takings 
claim.134  A closer look at Lucas, with specific emphasis on a first-
130. 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000). 
131. Id. at 84.  Some modern commentators on the public trust doctrine have asserted 
that it should be used as a tool for large scale ecological preservation, rather than just 
targeting species on a case by case basis.  Caspersen, supra note 9, at 375. 
132. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered not published). 
133. Id. at 347. 
134. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.  This statement is further supported by 
the premise put forth in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 
495 (9th Cir. 1981).  The limits of this premise have not been identified by the Supreme 
Court since, arguably, the legal theory driving Palila was only partially tested by the Supreme 
Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).  In Palila, plaintiffs charged that the state 
was taking an endangered bird species in violation of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  
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time review of the oral arguments presented during the Lucas 
remand, will further demonstrate this point. 
III. THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LUCAS REMAND AND THE INHERENT 
NATURE OF THE PUBLIC AND WILDLIFE TRUST DOCTRINES 
A. Background 
Given the property law precedents established in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, it is important to analyze whether the public 
and wildlife trust doctrines would provide a defense against the 
current trend of resistance to environmental protection measures, 
like the regulation at issue in Lucas. 
In 1986 David Lucas purchased two residential lots, with the 
purported intention of building single-family homes.135  In 1988 the 
South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management 
Act (“BMA”) in order to protect the South Carolina coast as a 
source of a variety of valuable uses and resources (the creation of a 
storm barrier, the generation of tourism, and the protection of 
both habitat for threatened and endangered species and vegetation 
crucial to the survival of the shoreline ecosystem).136  The 
legislature found that these uses and resources were increasingly 
threatened by development occurring along beachfront properties, 
and such development had increasingly caused the erosion of 
coastal lands.137  Thus, the legislature passed the BMA to “protect 
the quality of the coastal environment and to promote the 
economic and social improvement of the coastal zone and of all the 
people of the State.” 138  The legislature amended the BMA in 1990 
639 F.2d at 496.  The state maintained a population of sheep and goats for sport hunting, 
but these animals destroyed the native forest upon which the bird depended.  Id.  In its 
analysis, the court applied the Fish and Wildlife Service’s regulatory definition of “harm” 
under the ESA, which includes activity that degrades or destroys an endangered animal’s 
habitat.  Id. at 497.  The court concluded that the state caused harm to the Palila’s habitat 
and therefore its actions violated the ESA.  Id. at 497–98.  Application of the ESA to a parcel 
of property arguably makes bringing a successful takings claim much more difficult.  Since, 
in the Lucas case, the South Carolina legislature enacted its regulation in part to protect 
endangered species which depend on coastal habitat for survival, the wildlife trust doctrine 
could potentially be used to bolster the protection of such regulations from takings claims. 
135. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992). 
136. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10–48-39-30 (2008). 
137.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 n.10. 
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20. 
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to include an administrative remedy allowing the South Carolina 
Coastal Council (“Council”) to issue special use permits under 
some circumstances.139 
Because the BMA barred Lucas from erecting homes on his 
property, Lucas argued that it constituted a taking of his property 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.140  The trial court agreed, finding that Lucas’s 
property had been rendered “valueless.”141  However, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that the BMA was a valid 
use of the state’s polic
The case ultimately made its way to the United States Supreme 
Court, where Justice Scalia began his analysis by noting the oft-
quoted language in Pennsylvania Coal that “while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”142  The Court then established yet another 
nuance of takings jurisprudence, explaining that a regulation 
which strips property of all economic value is categorically a taking 
requiring just compensation.143  However, the Court’s holding also 
established an exception to the rule, stating that: 
 
 Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only 
if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s 
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title 
to begin with. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed 
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the 
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.144 
 
Without such a requirement, the Court found, a private property 
owner would have no notice that the value of his or her property 
139.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1). 
140. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007. 
141. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
142. Id. at 1014 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
143. Id. at 1016–18.  Scalia claimed that this was not a new aspect of takings law.  
However, others have asserted that the holding in Lucas is indeed a new slant on the takings 
analysis.  See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 1 at 850–51. 
144. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1029. 
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could potentially be eliminated.145  Thus, the Court asserted that in 
order for South Carolina to avoid compensating Lucas, it would 
need to prove on remand to the South Carolina Supreme Court 
that the purposes of the BMA were supported by background 
principles of South Carolina’s law of property or nuisance. 
B. The Lucas Remand 
On remand to the state supreme court, the state of South 
Carolina made little attempt to formulate the argument that the 
Lucas decision required before the state could avoid compensating 
for the BMA.  Less than a month after the United States Supreme 
Court handed down its decision, the Council filed a “Motion to 
Clarify Remand,” in which the Council requested that the South 
Carolina Supreme Court consider three issues: 1) whether Lucas 
could obtain a special use permit from the Council pursuant to the 
1990 amendments to the BMA, 2) whether a total or temporary 
taking had occurred, including a determination of damages, if any, 
and 3) whether there were any background principles of nuisance 
or property law that would deny a takings claim.146  The Council 
further asked the court to grant “permission to the parties to 
submit briefs or orally argue the positions concerning the 
framework for remand in order to insure that this case is brought 
to a speedy and conclusive end.”147  Lucas’s counsel filed a “Motion 
on Remand from the United States Supreme Court,” which focused 
primarily on proving economic loss.  Lucas claimed that his use of 
the property would not constitute a nuisance and asserted that the 
trial court’s grant of damages should be affirmed.148 
The South Carolina Supreme Court ultimately granted an oral 
argument for the case, which was held on November 18, 1992.  
During oral argument, the opening statement given by one justice 
was quite telling regarding the subsequently misdirected 
development of the arguments, and especially the arguments of the 
145. Id. at 1027–28. 
146. See generally Motion to Clarify Remand, South Carolina Coastal Council, Appellant, 
Jul. 23, 1992, at 2–4, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424 (Case No. 90–38) (on file 
with South Carolina Supreme Court Library). 
147. Id. at 4. 
148. See generally Motion on Remand from the United States Supreme Court, David H. 
Lucas, Respondent, Aug. 20, 1992, at 4–8, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424 (Case 
No. 90–38) (on file with South Carolina Supreme Court Library) [hereinafter Motion on 
Remand]. 
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We really are not too sure that the things that you have filed really 
address what is concerning the court. This matter was remanded to 
this court, and the purpose for having this hearing is to hear from 
Coastal Council and from counsel for Mr. Lucas regarding your 
interpretation of what the United States Supreme Court is requiring 
the South Carolina Supreme Court to do. We don’t think it would be 
beneficial to hear you reargue your position that you argued before, 
because the United States Supreme Court has determined that that is 
not the law in this case.149 
 
Thus the court highlighted that the motion filed by the Council 
was not adequately responsive to the directive handed down by the 
United States Supreme Court.  Even so, the Council opened the 
argument by addressing those same unresponsive issues.  Contrary 
to the third prong of the motion it filed, the Council failed to 
mention any intention to discuss background principles of property 
law that would allow the state to overcome Lucas’s takings claim.  
Instead, the Council focused primarily on the special permit issue 
and whether or not there was a total or temporary taking 
warranting damages.150  In essence, the Council argued that the 
United States Supreme Court never definitively ruled that there was 
a total taking, and that no total taking existed because Lucas had 
not yet exhausted administrative remedies by applying for a special 
use permit under the 1990 amendments to the BMA.  The Council 
argued that as a result, the only question was whether a temporary 
taking occurred between the passage of the original BMA in 1988 
and the amendments to the BMA in 1990.  The Council asserted 
that any temporary taking should only result in de minimis damages 
since Lucas did not suffer any substantial, actual damages.  Then 
the Council requested that the matter be remanded to them to 
decide whether a special use permit should be issued.151 
149. Audio tape: Oral argument before the South Carolina Supreme Court on remand 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council (see 505 U.S. 1003) (Nov. 
18, 1992) (on file with South Carolina Supreme Court Library). 
150. Id. 
151. Id.  The Council argued that actual damages for the temporary take should be based 
on four factors:  that Lucas was 1) able to use the property, 2) intended to use the property, 
3) had the capacity to begin construction, and 4) could provide an end date for the 
construction.  The Council argued there was nothing in the record to show the regulation 
from 1988 to 1990 did Lucas any harm.  Lucas maintained a vacant lot, and as a consequence 
the Council asserted that he may not have ever had plans to build during the two year period 
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Responding to Council’s argument that administrative remedies 
had not been exhausted under the 1990 BMA, and that the court 
should determine damages due for a temporary taking, one justice 
stated: 
 
But that case is not before us, is it . . . ?  [Lucas] has not made an 
application to [the] Coastal Council.  How can we remand a man 
when he has not made an application? . . . [T]he “total take” 
[question] . . . is not in front of us, is it?  The only thing that is in 
front of us is the impact of the 1988 Beachfront Management Act.  
Both parties asked us to let them amend the pleadings or amend the 
appeal to bring in the 1990 Act.  We declined to do that.  So what we 
have in front of us is the effect of the ‘88 Act only.  Isn’t that correct? 
Well then, how could [the] Coastal Council ever be involved in 
that?152 
 
Another justice evidenced similar frustration by asking, “wouldn’t 
you agree that up until this court makes some decision about this 
matter as a result of the United States Supreme Court, [Lucas] 
couldn’t do anything . . . regarding those two lots, could he?”  The 
justice further inquired how Lucas could have possibly applied for 
a permit under the 1990 Act since this court, in its decision in the 
case prior to the United States Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, 
held that his proposed activities were properly barred by the 1988 
Act.153 
Even after the court pointed out that the Council’s arguments 
were misguided and failed to address the issue for which the 
Supreme Court issued the remand, the Council persisted in its 
original argument.  The Council continued to concede that there 
was some form of taking, though only temporary, and that the de 
minimis damages for that taking should be determined by the court.  
In short, the Council proved to be completely unprepared and did 
not even attempt to argue the validity of the BMA on the basis of 
background principles of property law as the United States 
Supreme Court had required.154 
in the first instance.  As such, the Council argued that any damages awarded for the 
temporary take should be negligible.  Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. In fact, the Council seemed primarily focused on the need for quick resolution of 
the case.  In response to the South Carolina Supreme Court’s suggestion that the Council 
was incorrect regarding the procedural posture of the case when it requested a remand to 
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Even when directly asked by the South Carolina Supreme Court to 
argue the United States Supreme Court’s “background principles” 
directive, the Council failed to effectively address the issue. Most 
strikingly, one justice actually invited the Council to argue 
application of the public trust doctrine to the BMA: 
 
Would you propose to justify [the BMA] on the basis of some 
common law doctrine of . . . noxious use or on some public trust 
doctrine? . . . [T]he Supreme Court forbids you to justify the 
regulation on the basis of the ‘88 Beach Management Act.  They say if 
you are going to completely prohibit use under that Act, then you 
have “taken,” certainly for that period of time . . . .  [T]hey leave open 
the question of whether you could justify that regulatory taking on 
some common law basis, which presumably would include public trust . . . .  
But as a practical matter, what else would you really have to say 
besides that, to justify the regulatory taking in the face of what the 
Supreme Court said . . . ?155 
 
Thus the court itself suggested that the Council could legitimately 
argue for the application of the public trust doctrine pursuant to 
the Supreme Court’s directive, possibly saving the BMA and the 
resources it protected from Lucas’s takings claim.  Instead, the 
Council only focused briefly on the nuisance portion of the 
Supreme Court’s directive.  For instance, one justice asked the 
Council, “Can you even attempt to prove any kind of common law 
nuisance? . . .  The only way you’re going to be able to prevail is you 
are going to have to prove that something in his title would prevent 
him from building.  You are out of the ballpark on that, right?”156  
The Council then basically capitulated, declaring that it was 
unprepared to make a nuisance argument and that this was a “very 
the agency, the Council stated “if we could actually deal with the temporary damages 
issue . . . we would all be better off in terms of the length of time the trial took. But again I 
cannot change court procedure.”  Furthermore, the Council’s attorney made numerous 
statements that arguably indicated not only a lack of vigorous representation, but also a lack 
of understanding of the United States Supreme Court’s decision.  Regarding the requested 
remand to the Council on the special permit issue, which a justice pointed out was not a 
question before the court, the Council stated, “I’ve found of late that some of my legal 
conclusions may not be the best in the world . . . I’ve certainly had my share of . . . 
misunderstandings of the law in the course of my career.”  Id.  Counsel also responded to 
opposing counsel’s suggestion to settle the case by stating that, “[f]or me personally, I’d 
almost say ‘sure’ and write him a check myself . . . I cannot speak for my fourteen member 
board.”  Id. 
155. Id. (emphasis added). 
156. Id. 
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difficult hurdle for the Council to overcome.”157 
When the Council finally attempted to make an improvised 
nuisance argument, one justice highlighted the futility of that 
argument by stating that there are “fine homes built on both sides 
of . . . these two lots.  There is no way in the world you are going to 
be able to establish that . . . a nuisance is going to be created there 
by building a home . . . .”158  The Council once again reverted to 
the primary arguments it established in its motion and finally 
concluded by simply stating that it “would like to get this matter 
resolved in the fashion of an appropriate remand or just a 
conclusion that [Lucas] did not effectively, at trial, prove that there 
was a total taking.”159 
Ultimately, the oral arguments before the South Carolina 
Supreme Court exhibited a failure on the part of the Council to 
adequately address the question that the United States Supreme 
Court directed it to address on remand.  Most importantly, at the 
same time that the Council failed to make a public trust argument 
in order to save the BMA, the court itself suggested the use of the 
public trust doctrine as a potential background principle of 
property law that might overcome takings claims brought against 
regulations protecting upland coastal resources in South Carolina.  
However, the Council was unprepared to accept the court’s 
invitation to argue the public trust doctrine, and therefore missed 
an important opportunity to establish a strong public trust 
precedent for the defense of such environmental regulations in 
response to the Lucas decision. 
Given the misdirected arguments made by the Council, it is not 
surprising that the court ruled in favor of Lucas, who argued that 
“[b]ecause ‘background principles of nuisance and property law’ in 
South Carolina do not prohibit construction of a conforming and 
similarly situated residence in an area zoned residential, there is no 
need to remand this case for further evidentiary findings.”160  The 
court gave short shrift to the matter, stating in its final order: 
 
We have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties 
157. Id. 
158. Id.  Lucas’s counsel also focused solely on the nuisance directive issued by the 
Supreme Court, and never responded to the background principle of property law directive, 
which would have potentially covered the public trust doctrine. 
159. Id. 
160. Motion on Remand, supra note 148, at 5. 
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regarding whether Coastal Council possesses the ability under the 
common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a habitable 
structure on his land.  Coastal Council has not persuaded us that any 
common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas’s desired use 
of his land.161 
 
By failing to present an argument based on the public trust 
doctrine, the Council forced the court to “ignore[ ] the second 
part of the exception for ‘background principles of property 
law,’ . . . [by] not analyz[ing] possible public trust rights in the 
beach front property.”162 
Ultimately, the Lucas remand demonstrates that the South 
Carolina Supreme Court understood the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision to allow state assertion of the public trust doctrine 
as a background principle of property law in order to defend the 
BMA.  This point is particularly important considering that the 
BMA protected a variety of resources over which the state of South 
Carolina had never before asserted public trust authority.  South 
Carolina common law at the time of Lucas included public trust 
protection of navigable waters and tidal lands, but had never before 
incorporated public trust protection of species’ habitat, shoreline 
vegetation, and other upland coastal resources.163  The South 
Carolina Supreme Court’s invitation to the state indicates that state 
courts, in their role as author of state common law property rights, 
161. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). 
162. Caspersen, supra note 9, at 373. 
163. In the most recent South Carolina case upholding public trust protection for 
navigable waters and tidal lands, a landowner claimed that he was deprived of all 
economically beneficial use of his property due to wetlands regulations, and so was owed 5th 
Amendment takings compensation.  McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 589 S.E.2d 116, cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 982 (2003).  In denying the claim the court noted the longstanding South 
Carolina common law tradition of applying public trust principles to navigable waters and 
tidal lands, stating that  
 
South Carolina has a long line of cases regarding the public trust doctrine in the 
context of land bordering navigable waters.  Historically, the State holds presumptive 
title to land below the high water mark.  As stated by this Court in 1884, not only does 
the State hold title to this land in jus privatum, it holds it in jus publicum, in trust for the 
benefit of all the citizens of this State. 
 
Id. at 119 (internal citations omitted).  Another South Carolina Supreme Court case, 
decided over four years prior to Lucas, applied the public trust doctrine to protect streams 
and marshland from impoundment by the South Carolina Coastal Council.  State ex rel. 
Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d 716 (1986).  On remand, the state did not argue 
the relevance of any of the above cited cases. 
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can permit the evolution of background principles over time, even 
in the absence of prior state precedent.164 
But what of federal courts?  Do they have a role to play in 
applying these doctrines?  In Lucas, the United States Supreme 
Court gave no indication that it considered the application of 
public trust principles or that it would have upheld the South 
Carolina statute had the state made a public trust argument.  In 
fact, the Court focused primarily on nuisance as one example of 
background principles and failed to highlight other examples, 
which it could have done by acknowledging its own precedent 
establishing the public and wildlife trust doctrines as background 
principles of property law (Illinois Central and Geer).  Under the 
circumstances presented in Lucas, consideration of these principles 
is clearly warranted.  For instance, given that the South Carolina 
legislature focused on wildlife habitat, vegetation, and general 
protection of the coastal zone as reasons for passage of the BMA,165 
the public and wildlife trust doctrines were clearly relevant to the 
outcome of the state’s case under the “background principles” 
analysis of Lucas.  In other words, the BMA is itself evidence that 
164. In fact, scholars have highlighted that positive legislative enactments, like the 
Beachfront Management Act, may also constitute “background principles” of property law, 
and that courts need not be limited by prior state court precedent.  One scholar noted that 
the Lucas Court  
 
insisted that a newly enacted land use restriction must be solidly grounded in the[ ] age-
old principles [of property and nuisance law] if it is to be considered an inherent 
limitation on title.  In fact, the Court also spoke of ‘newly decreed’ limitations on land 
use—a phrase that at least intimates that the application of existing legislation may 
require compensation if it goes beyond the limitations inherent in common law 
principles . . . .  In my view, the scope of the exception to the total takings rule should 
not be defined (or limited) solely by reference to common law principles.  Statutes have 
historically played an important role in establishing the contours of private property 
rights, and the Court does not, in other contexts, distinguish between state law derived 
from legislation and state common law.  Moreover, nothing about the genesis of 
common law principles so distinguishes the common law from legislation that we should 
privilege it above statutes in determining whether a particular land use entitlement was 
inherent in an owner’s title. 
 
Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law:  Considering Inherent Limitations on Title, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1996).  See also Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely 
Legacy:  The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
321, 354–61 (2005) (discussing state and federal court cases holding that statutes, 
regulations, and constitutional provisions can constitute background principles of property 
and nuisance law). 
165. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
0.6. HUDSON.34.1 NO BANNER 3/9/2009  1:58:31 PM 
2009]The Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines and the Lucas Remand 137 
 
the legislature sought to protect resources in trust for the public 
and, had the state made such an argument, the specific application 
of the BMA in question may have survived the takings claim.  
Scholars have noted: 
 
The reasoning in . . . Lucas . . . suggests the possibility that land use 
restrictions may be imposed without offending the Fifth Amendment 
if they are aimed at protecting wildlife . . . .  However, if the land use 
restriction inheres in the landowner’s title, no compensation is owed.  
This qualification leaves open the possibility that because a 
landowner’s property right has never been construed to extend to 
wildlife, and because under old English law the rights of private 
landowners were constrained by obligations to protect wildlife and its 
habitat, restrictions to protect wildlife will not require 
compensation.166 
 
Given the apparent relevance of the public and wildlife trust 
doctrines to takings analysis, as demonstrated by the Lucas remand, 
and the early establishment of public and wildlife trust precedent 
in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, why did the United 
States Supreme Court fail to consider these doctrines under the 
circumstances that Lucas presented? 
It is possible that the majority of the Court—if they considered 
the issue—doubted that these doctrines were background 
principles under South Carolina’s law of property because South 
Carolina’s public trust protections at common law did not extend 
beyond navigable waters and tidal lands.  As noted, the state of 
South Carolina had never before declared, nor had it historically 
viewed the upland coastal resources at issue in Lucas as protected 
by the public trust doctrine.167  It is a long-settled premise that 
federal courts do not craft state common law.168  Indeed, the 
United States Supreme Court makes it very clear that the 
background principles that should determine the outcome of a 
particular case are “background principles of the State’s law of 
property,” not background principles recognized by other states.169  
In this view, principles of public trust protection for upland coastal 
resources may very well be background principles of property law 
166.  BEAN, supra note 53, at 38. 
167. The author could not locate any cases directly on point on this issue.   
168. See, e.g., Murdoch v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 608 (1875). 
169. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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in Oregon170 or Maine,171 but not of South Carolina.172  Similarly, 
the Court might recognize the wildlife trust doctrine as a 
background principle of property law in New York,173 but deem that 
of little relevance to the law of property in South Carolina.  Such an 
outcome might be necessary due to the issue of notice, as 
recognizing one state’s public or wildlife trust doctrine as a 
background principle of another state’s common law might deprive 
the property owner of notice of important risks to ownership.174 
This argument, although with surface appeal, fails to recognize 
that the public and wildlife trust doctrines are principles very much 
akin to the police power, arising from the inherent sovereignty of 
each and every state.  Because of this “background principle,” a 
state government can act on those powers via its legislative 
authority at whatever point in time the state deems necessary—
whether it be 1788 or 1988.  In fact, the public trust doctrine and 
the police power have been analogized in this way by the United 
States Supreme Court.175  In both Illinois Central and Geer, the 
Court’s approach assumed that both the public and wildlife trust 
doctrines inhere in all property in the U.S. prior to the transfer of 
that property to private hands.  As a result, these doctrines became 
“background principles of property law” in each and every state.  
This inherency not only allows state courts to apply the doctrines in 
an evolving fashion over time, but also allows federal courts to 
uphold state application of the doctrines even in the absence of 
prior state precedent.  Such precedent may not be available if the 
state is seeking to apply the doctrines for the first time or in a new 
fashion to previously unprotected resources. However, federal 
court action is appropriate because the underlying public and 
wildlife trust background principles, as required by Lucas, remain 
perpetually available for invocation by any state that is party to a 
federal case. 
Environmental legislation passed pursuant to these doctrines, in 
a non-arbitrary fashion and with appropriate parameters as 
determined by the courts, should, therefore, be immune from 
takings claims under the circumstances presented in a case like 
170. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940, 942 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
171. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989). 
172. See supra note 163. 
173. See generally Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917). 
174. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28. 
175. See infra notes 177–184 and accompanying text. 
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Lucas.  Furthermore, state legislatures enacting environmental 
regulations should be allowed to emulate other states’ legislative 
applications of the public and wildlife trust doctrines regardless of 
whether those fact-specific applications had previously been a part 
of the enacting state’s common law of property. 
C. Inherent Doctrines:  Applying the Public and Wildlife Trust 
Doctrines Non-Exclusively 
The Court in Illinois Central stated that the public trust is 
embedded in states as a part of “their inherent sovereignty” and 
that “any act of legislation concerning [the use of lands subject to 
the trust] affects the public welfare.”176  The Court’s statement 
indicates that this governmental prerogative and inherent common 
law principle vested in each state equally at the time of its creation; 
in other words as a “background principle of property law.”  As 
such, the public and wildlife trust doctrines are pre-existing 
principles that inhere in each landowner’s title to property, 
regardless of the state in which the landowner owns property. 
Not only did this sovereignty inhere with regard to the general 
authority of states to act pursuant to the public trust doctrine, but 
also with regard to the specific natural resources a state chooses to 
protect.  A parallel can be drawn between use of the public trust 
doctrine and use of the police power—just as all state legislatures 
can enact different zoning regulations pursuant to the police 
power, they are able to make determinations on what constitutes a 
public trust-protected resource without first having it declared a 
common law principle by the particular state’s court. 
The parallel between the police power and public trust doctrine 
is made clear by the statement in Illinois Central that the state “can 
no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people 
are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government . . . .”177  Thus, the Court analogizes 
the inherent nature of state public trust power with that of the 
police power.  The police power, like the public trust doctrine, 
inhered in all states equally at the time of state establishment,178 
and therefore one state may act pursuant to the police power in a 
176. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892). 
177. Id. at 453. 
178. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (stating that “the Founders denied the 
National Government [the police power] and reposed [it] in the States”). 
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non-exclusive fashion.  For example, the South Carolina legislature 
could enact legislation under its police power which emulated a 
North Carolina law, regardless of whether South Carolina courts 
had previously incorporated the specific subject of legislation into 
South Carolina common law.  The only role of the courts in such 
circumstances is to ensure that the legislature’s use of the police 
power is not arbitrary or unreasonable.179 
The Supreme Court validated the general applicability of 
inherent powers in the context of the police power in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.180  There the Court paved the way for 
federal courts to uphold state laws invoking the public or wildlife 
trust doctrines for protection of resources regardless of whether 
those doctrines had been previously invoked by the state to protect 
the same or similar resources.  Euclid involved a constitutional 
challenge to zoning regulations passed by the local government.181  
As is often the case with environmental regulation, the claimants 
argued that zoning was an unreasonable intrusion on their private 
property rights and that the government should not use zoning to 
restrict the use of their property.182  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
ruling that zoning was a proper exercise of the state’s inherent 
police power.  The Court noted that “it must be said before the 
ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions 
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to” the proper exercise of the inherent police power.183  
Though the case arose in the state of Ohio, the Court’s ruling 
179. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
180. 272 U.S. 365.  In fact, scholars have observed the parallel between the inherent 
police power (and zoning laws passed pursuant to it) and Lucas “background principles” by 
noting that  
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra helps identify the types of regulations 
that are sufficiently traditional in scope to be background principles of property law. . . .  
[T]he Chief Justice conceded that at least some ‘valid zoning and land-use’ regulations 
are insulated from takings liability under Lucas’s background principles framework.  The 
Chief Justice explained that ‘zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of 
state property law’ . . . . 
 
Blumm, supra note 164, at 358 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 352 (2002)). 
181. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 395. 
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applies to all states because each state was vested with the police 
power at the time of the state’s creation.184  It was not necessary that 
each and every state in the union bring a separate zoning case prior 
to enacting zoning regulations pursuant to the police power; the 
police power is considered both a background principle and 
general tool of common law legislative authority. 
Similarly, the Illinois Central Court made numerous additional 
statements indicating that the public and wildlife trust doctrines 
are inherent background principles of common law property 
vested in each and every state upon its creation.  At the outset of its 
analysis, the Court made clear that “[t]he state of Illinois was 
admitted into the Union . . . on equal footing with the original 
states, in all respects.”185  The Court also noted that states need not 
be subject to principles of exclusivity in exercising public trust 
sovereignty when it stated that “[t]here can be no distinction 
between the several states of the Union in the character of their 
jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and 
exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits.”186 
The Court further noted that: 
 
 It is . . . settled law of this country that the ownership of and 
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within 
the limits of the several states, belong to the respective states within 
which they are found . . . . 
 The same doctrine is . . . applicable to lands covered by fresh water 
in the Great Lakes.187 
 
The Court thus asserted that the public trust in this particular 
resource, lake beds, inhered in all states in this regard, not just the 
state of Illinois.  As a result, it is clear that lake beds in the state of 
South Carolina could be similarly protected by the state legislature 
without the express prior approval of the South Carolina state 
courts.188  Furthermore, since it appears that submerged lands are 
184. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (stating that “the principle that 
[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a 
generalized police power to the States, is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
185. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892). 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 435. 
188. But see supra note 163. 
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but one resource which may be protected pursuant to the public 
trust doctrine, the South Carolina legislature should be able to 
protect wildlife, habitat, coasts, and other resources accordingly. 
In addition to Illinois Central, Geer provides perhaps the strongest 
evidence that the Supreme Court did not regard the public or 
wildlife trust doctrines as doctrines to examine purely within the 
precedential confines of independent state jurisdictions.  Indeed, 
as discussed below, the Geer Court did what has here been 
suggested—the Court looked to the wildlife trust doctrine as 
exercised in other states and applied it to a state which had never 
previously incorporated those fact-specific applications of the 
doctrine into its common law jurisprudence. 
The Geer Court cited courts in three different states for the 
proposition that the state of Connecticut could enact a regulation 
for the protection of wildlife.  In contrast, the Court cited no case 
from the state of Connecticut, and it appears that no Connecticut 
court had ever before considered the specific wildlife trust doctrine 
application in question;189 just as South Carolina had never 
considered the application of the public trust doctrine to upland 
coastal resources prior to Lucas. 
First, the Geer Court recognized “a well-considered opinion of the 
supreme court of California,” which had ruled that: 
 
 The wild game within a state belongs to the people in their 
collective sovereign capacity.  It is not the subject of private 
ownership, except in so far as the people may elect to make it so; and 
they may, if they see fit, absolutely prohibit the taking of it, or traffic 
and commerce in it, if it is deemed necessary for the protection or 
preservation of the public good.190 
 
Next, the Court noted that “the same view ha[d] been expressed 
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,” which stated that: 
 
 The preservation of such animals . . . is a matter of public interest, 
and it is within the police power of the state, as the representative of 
the people in their united sovereignty, to make such laws as will best 
preserve such game, and secure its beneficial use in the future to the 
189. The author could not locate any cases that indicated that Connecticut had 
previously considered the issue in question in Geer. 
190. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (citing Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402, 402 
(Cal. 1894)). 
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citizens; and to that end it may adopt any reasonable regulations.191 
 
Finally, the Court acknowledged the wildlife trust doctrine as set 
forth by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which had found that: 
 
 So far as we are aware, it has never been judicially denied that the 
government, under its police powers, may make regulations for the 
preservation of game and fish, restricting their taking and 
molestation . . . .  It is, perhaps, accurate to say that the ownership of 
the sovereign authority is in trust for all the people of the state; and 
hence, by implication, it is the duty of the legislature to enact such 
laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its 
beneficial use in the future to the people of the state. But, in any 
view, the question of individual enjoyment is one of public policy, 
and not of private right.192 
 
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that “[t]he foregoing analysis of 
the principles upon which alone rests the . . . power of the state . . . 
to control [ ] ownership [in game] for the common benefit, clearly 
demonstrates the validity of the statute of the state of Connecticut 
here in controversy.”193 
Geer is a good example of how the Supreme Court has applied a 
background principle of property law, the wildlife trust doctrine, 
equally across states, even though the individual state in question 
had not incorporated the specific application of that principle into 
its common law.  The Court did so with the wildlife trust doctrine 
in Geer, with the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central, and with the 
police power in Euclid.  Given that federal courts do not craft state 
common law, inherent sovereign powers like the police power and 
public and wildlife trust doctrines are the only powers which may 
be so exercised.  This interpretation should be an adequate 
response to arguments objecting to the application of the public 
and wildlife trust doctrines by federal courts in such circumstances. 
In summary, in order to uphold environmental regulation based 
upon the public and wildlife trust doctrines, federal courts need 
not look with exclusivity at the public trust doctrine case law of 
individual states.  Instead, exercise of the public trust doctrine 
should be viewed on the same plane as state exercise of the police 
191. Id. at 533 (citing State v. Rodman, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099 (Minn. 1894)). 
192. Id. at 533–34 (citing Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320, 334 (1881)). 
193. Id. at 529. 
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power, as in Euclid.  The public and wildlife trust doctrines can 
serve as background principles of state property law, per Lucas, 
without the state courts having ever previously incorporated the 
regulation of the specific resource in question into the state’s 
common law.  Had the Supreme Court undertaken this analysis of 
its own precedent, as established in Illinois Central and Geer, the 
outcome of Lucas might have been quite different—the Court 
could have upheld state application of the public and wildlife trust 
doctrines itself to overcome the takings claim.194 
D.  Checks on Expansive Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrine 
Application 
Finally, one might argue that allowing broad application of the 
public and wildlife trust doctrines, to both the types of resources 
which may be protected and the breadth of jurisdictions which may 
exert such protections, could destroy important private property 
rights.  The criticism might be that almost any amenity or resource 
could be characterized as a “public interest,” and there would be 
no limit on the application of these doctrines.  A democratically 
elected government might then be allowed to “take” property by 
regulation without paying for it.  Scholars have addressed this 
criticism, stating that: 
 
Indeed, the scope of the public trust doctrine is subject to 
considerable debate.  Many scholars acknowledge the public trust 
doctrine but maintain that the reach of the doctrine should be fixed.  
They argue that sudden shifts in the doctrine’s application cannot 
inhere in a title because abrupt changes in the doctrine cannot be 
consistent with settled rules of state law.  Critics of an evolving public 
trust doctrine are correct that sudden shifts in a doctrine argue 
against its characterization as a background principle.  But it is 
inconsistent to recognize the public trust doctrine as a background 
principle on one hand and then limit its application to a “traditional 
scope” on the other.  Controlled evolution is inherent in the very 
definition of the public trust doctrine; the fundamental purpose of 
the doctrine is to meet the public’s changing circumstances and 
needs.  Just as what constitutes nuisance has changed over time, so 
too has the public trust doctrine slowly been “molded and extended” 
to satisfy the needs “of the public it was created to benefit.”  Careful, 
predictable expansions of the doctrine, therefore, are not novel 
194. This would be contrary to the Court’s assertion that this was to be decided at the 
state level.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). 
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legislative decrees, but constitute a firmly embedded exercise of state 
duty.195 
 
Indeed, courts already perform a check on application of the 
public trust doctrine in the various states.  As the above statement 
demonstrates, the public and wildlife trust doctrines need not be 
treated any differently than nuisance law, especially with regard to 
the way each doctrine has evolved.  Furthermore, standards of 
controlled application are already in place for other background 
principles of state power, such as the sovereign and inherent police 
power, as no regulation enacted pursuant to that power may be 
arbitrary or unreasonable.196 
Likewise, the courts can continue to place bounds on application 
of the public and wildlife trust doctrines.  Cases already 
demonstrate such bounds, as legislatures have been required to 
show that species or resources are numerically valuable, i.e. scarce 
or endangered, or otherwise economically valuable.197  As such, 
195. Kanner, supra note 55, at 67 (citing Zachary C. Kleinsasser, The Law and Planning of 
Public Open Space:  Boston’s Big Dig and Beyond, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 433–34 (2005) 
(citation omitted)).  Another scholar noted that  
 
[s]ome commentators have argued that an expanded, non-tidal application of the 
public trust as a defense to takings claims is inconsistent and irreconcilable with Lucas 
because it exceeds common law understandings of the doctrine.  But this argument 
seems inconsistent with the Lucas Court’s suggestion that background principles may 
have the potential to evolve beyond their historical scope. 
 
Blumm, supra note 164, at 343. 
196. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1928) (holding that it is the role of the courts to ensure that 
the legislature’s use of the police power is not arbitrary). 
197. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1917); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
(1928); State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 2000); Sierra Club v. 
Dep’t of Forestry and Fire Protection, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ordered 
not published); National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).  For 
example, economic value presumably could include medicinal value of plants which treat a 
variety of illnesses.  Also, in another parallel to zoning, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Lucas 
highlighted that courts have frequently looked to the generality of a regulation to determine 
whether or not a taking occurred.  Stevens, citing Euclid, stated,  
 
[p]erhaps the most familiar application of this principle of generality arises in zoning 
cases. A diminution in value caused by a zoning regulation is far less likely to constitute 
a takings if it is part of a general and comprehensive land-use plan . . . conversely ‘spot 
zoning’ is far more likely to constitute a taking. 
 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1073 (1992).  Stevens continued,  
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assertion of the public or wildlife trust doctrines by legislatures 
would not reflect the whimsical will of a determined majority, but 
instead a genuine, statistically validated attempt by the legislature 
to protect an important environmental resource which otherwise 
would be lost to the public at large. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to protect the environment from the harmful acts of 
private landowners, it is necessary for the government to maintain 
the authority to enact necessary environmental regulations.  Such 
regulations are sometimes thwarted by private property owners 
asserting Fifth Amendment takings claims.  It is clear, however, that 
the public and wildlife trust doctrines, deeply rooted in American 
historical jurisprudence, provide valuable tools to overcome some 
of these challenges.  These doctrines have been applied in an 
evolving fashion by both state legislatures and state courts.  A 
collection of federal and state cases, guided primarily by the 
principles established in Illinois Central and Geer, place not only 
submerged lands and coastal zones within the coverage of the 
public and wildlife trust doctrines, but also wildlife, plants, habitat, 
and other environmental resources of great public concern.  If 
properly asserted, or even argued at all, these doctrines may have 
obviated the need of the South Carolina Supreme Court, on the 
Lucas remand, to find that the BMA constituted a taking. 
Just as with the police power, a strong argument exists that the 
public and wildlife trust doctrines are virtually identical 
background principles of property law vested in every state equally 
at the time of creation.  If any state validly retains the power to 
protect a particular valuable resource under the public or wildlife 
trust doctrines, any and all states may attempt to regulate in such a 
manner, regardless of whether that particular state’s courts 
 
[i]n considering Lucas’s claim, the generality of the Beachfront Management Act is 
significant.  The Act does not target particular landowners, but rather regulates the use 
of the coastline of the entire State.  Indeed, South Carolina’s Act is best understood as 
part of a national effort to protect the coastline, one initiated by the federal Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972. 
 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1074.  Thus, whether or not the public or wildlife trust doctrines are 
asserted as part of a general comprehensive scheme might provide an additional parameter 
to appropriately limit application of the doctrines in the takings context. 
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previously incorporated the subject of regulation into its body of 
common law.  It is enough that the state legislature makes a valid, 
supported assertion that the resource being protected is of great 
public importance, and that courts find the statute to be reasonable 
and non-arbitrary.  This approach is supported by the “inherent 
sovereignty” analysis of Illinois Central, as well as the Geer Court’s 
reliance on other states’ public trust doctrines when interpreting a 
Connecticut statute.  Had the Supreme Court considered these 
principles in Lucas, perhaps it would have found it unnecessary to 
remand the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court. 
History demonstrates that the public and wildlife trust doctrines 
are valid “background principles of property law” which can 
overcome takings claims brought against state environmental 
regulations, both at the state and federal level.  It will be important 
to look to history if today’s environment is to be preserved for 
future generations of private property owners. 
 
